Militarization Nation (Part II): What do you do with a problem like militarization?
After a brief pause, Next Sexenio returns to wrap up discussion of the militarization of Mexico. The focus: What comes next?
A few weeks ago, I published Part I of this post. In it, I discussed how Mexico’s military gained so much power and influence, particularly in the years since President Andrés Manuel López Obrador came to power.
I’m picking up that series to consider what comes next once President López Obrador’s term ends and his successor comes to power.
What do you do with a problem like militarization?
Several weeks ago, I discussed the many ways in which the Mexican military gained more power and influence in the last two decades and how that trend rapidly accelerated over the previous five years in which President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has been president. As a reminder, I detailed the increased reliance on the military in security-related matters — a trend that began under President Felipe Calderón (2006-12) — and how that evolved into the situation we see today in which the military now controls some 240+ government functions that were once delegated to civilian authorities. That growth in responsibilities includes increased involvement in security-related matters, the operation of sea and airports (including collecting tariffs), construction of civilian infrastructure (e.g., railways, airports, etc.), construction of banks, and so much more. I also noted why Mexico became more militarized in recent years: It proved expedient to the president to have the military carry out these tasks. Finally, I ended with concerns about corruption and the mismanagement of public resources, among other issues.
Where to next?
The rapid increase in the military’s strength raises serious questions about the future that must be grappled with. First and foremost, what comes next? Will the next president reign in the military? Second — and equally important —, even if they wanted to, can the next president effectively scale down the reach of Mexico’s military? There’s a lot at stake for the military and the next president, and the two are likely to be at odds. Third, what will be the long-term impact of the last five years of rapid militarization? How will it impact security in Mexico?
In this post, I’ll deal with the first two parts. While I am acquainted with public security matters in Mexico, it is by no means my area of expertise. For that reason, I’ll leave that bit to the side for someone else to deal with in the future.
Much to do or Nothing
The next president of Mexico will have some difficult decisions to make concerning Mexico’s militarization. They can offer it more opportunities to grow and expand its reach, keep the military large but curtail further growth, or begin curtailing its size and ambitions.
The first path is the most dangerous. Of course, the continued growth of Mexico’s military could put too much power in its hands.
This would only exacerbate concerns around corruption, the misallocation of government funds (e.g., via potential corruption in customs management), and the rapidly rising portion of the federal budget allocated to the military. Second-order impacts of this approach include the further hollowing out of state-level governments, which have seen some of their responsibilities shift to the military, and creating long-term fiscal pressures on Mexico’s public finances (e.g., it would become harder to downsize government spending during economic downturns). Doing so would only further entrench the potential for corruption and other misconduct and undercut transparency and economic opportunities.
Over time, the further entrenchment of the military in conducting once-civilian functions could push its leadership to align more closely — and more dangerously — with one party. Why? That’s what happens when the survival of two entities becomes intertwined.
In this case, that one party would be Morena, given that it is in power now and remains likely to win in 2024. I try not to be fatalist about this point, but it must be raised as a risk.
The second path may be the easiest for the next president.
Mexico’s next leader may maintain the military’s size and allow it to keep many of the functions that it adopted during the López Obrador administration. However, it still raises many of the same challenges as the first.
Maintaining the status quo is not as simple as it sounds. The military must be given new responsibilities as old projects wrap up to maintain current levels of influence. Yes, some tasks are ongoing (e.g., management of airports and customs facilities — oh, and you know, public security). Others, like the construction of the Tren Maya or airports, will innately end. That means more resources must be allocated to projects for the military to complete. In many cases, these projects are likely to be frivolous and not economically productive — and that’s before we even address the question of whether the military is fit to be constructing public infrastructure in the first place.
Maintaining the military’s current level of influence would reduce the potential for head-butting between the executive and military leadership. It would keep employment in the military high and ensure that spheres of influence do not atrophy. However, it would fail to address the threats posed by militarization, including in the likely case that Morena retains the presidency in 2024, that the military will associate its hold on economic and political power as being reliant on Morena being in power.
The third path, stripping the military of many of its recently added functions — will be the most challenging.
It is the most necessary, but it will be the hardest. To achieve this aim, not only must Mexico’s military be downsized — meaning cutting staff and military leaders’ influence, potentially having political implications for the new president — but civilian authorities must re-adopt those responsibilities, as well.
Operating on the fair assumption that corruption exists in the military’s management of these new functions (e.g., diverting funding for projects, customs duties, etc.), vast economic and political interests are now imbued into many government functions. While corruption certainly existed in Mexican institutions before President López Obrador came to power, a complete absence of transparency into military spending, its leaders’ financial situations, and other areas only entrenches military leaders’ sense that remaining in power is essential.
Successfully downsizing the military may require the next leader to hold those in power today accountable for any rule-breaking. Yes, the next president could reduce the military’s size without ensuring accountability for past actions. But, to downsize the military successfully and in a politically viable way, Mexico’s next president must demonstrate why it is essential and why the military being involved in so much of public life does not return the best value to citizens.
Doing so would be a double-edged sword. The military will likely need to be knocked down a peg for its size to be successfully curtailed and defeat any opposition against such policies. However, this must happen in a way that does not further harm the public’s already limited trust in the military’s capacities to manage public security. Already today, a lack of confidence in the public security forces already undermines their capacity to tackle crime.
Additionally, to reduce the militarization of Mexico, the next president would need to reassign functions back to civilian-run government agencies and ministries. That may sound as simple as making a few orders, but in many cases, the bureaucracy that was once there to manage these tasks — running customs enforcement, managing airports, procuring private-sector contracts for infrastructure projects, running immigration, etc. — no longer exists. The bureaucrats have likely moved onto new jobs, the skills and organizational structures once possessed by Mexico’s institutions have atrophied, and so on. Reassigning public functions back to civilian-led government agencies will effectively require starting from scratch. And, while yes, individuals in the military who serve in those functions today could shift into a civilian role, old habits die hard, and that means the corruption, corner-cutting, and other risks that I’ve discussed throughout this post are likely to remain entrenched if the label is only changed from military to civilian.
The optimistic case
This post has been quite a downer to write, and for good reason. However, I want to strike a more optimistic note as it draws to an end: Politics is likely on the side of reducing the military’s size should the next president — whoever it is — wish to do so.
The next president will find allies from across political parties and likely find the necessary votes to reverse militarization in Mexico if they prioritize it. A Morena president (the likely scenario after the election) would certainly find support for reigning in the military from the opposition, which has opposed its growing reach under the current administration.
Similarly, those within the president’s party, Morena, express concern about expanding the military’s role and its unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court, which has seen many justices appointed by the president, has curbed some of the military’s lack of oversight, and there are indeed members of the military’s leadership who are not entirely comfortable with the rapid expansions of its power.
Downsize and do it soon
The next president will need to act quickly if they are to curtail the trajectory of the military’s growth of power. The longer this trend persists, and the military retains an advantaged political and economic position, the more difficult it will be to revert. If a correction is not made early by the next president, it only becomes more likely that leaders will see opportunities to use the military for practicality and to take it, further strengthening the military and entrenching its associated challenges. That’s a trend that becomes dangerous for a constitutional democracy, for a country’s economy, and for every individual living there.